In arguing for a role of conscious reflection in successful completion of the A not B task, Marcovitch and Zelazo have provided a novel and potentially viable account of the origin, or more accurately the resolution, of the A not B error. The general U-shaped effect of the number of A trials on the probability of error on a B trial (i.e. greater likelihood of error with intermediate numbers of A trials preceding the critical B trial than with few or many A trials: Marcovitch, Zelazo & Schmuckler, 2002; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2006) , together with the systematic nature of performance on B trials (i.e. that performance on a B trial, once correct, remains correct on subsequent responses: Marcovitch et al. , 2002) , appears to provide compelling evidence for Marcovitch and Zelazo's position. Yet the authors go further -they relate their theory to the development of executive function (EF). This is a laudable goal given the limited research to date on EF abilities of infants.
However, close inspection of Marcovitch and Zelazo's hierarchical competing systems model (HCSM) raises a number of troubling issues. For simplicity, let us begin by accepting the evidence at face value. Does the HCSM advance our understanding of the development of EF? A major difficulty in the study of EF is that different researchers adopt different definitions of EF. Thus, Marcovitch and Zelazo take EF to be 'the cognitive processes underlying the conscious control of behaviour' (p. 1, emphasis added), and draw on Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter and Wager's (2000) characterization of EF as comprising (at least) three separable but interacting components: task switching, response inhibition and memory updating. Miyake et al. , however, characterize EF as 'general-purpose control mechanisms that modulate the operation of various cognitive subprocesses and thereby regulate the dynamics of human cognition' (Miyake et al. , 2000, p. 50) . Critically, Miyake et al. make no claims about EF and consciousness. In contrast, conscious reflection is the central explanatory mechanism in Marcovitch and Zelazo's account of correct performance on the A not B task.
Unfortunately, Marcovitch and Zelazo provide no evidence that the hypothesized process they label 'conscious reflection' has any characteristic of consciousness beyond being discrete all-or-nothing. Worse, 'conscious reflection' by itself can provide no account of many accepted findings in A not B and related tasks. For example, infants are more likely to perseverate on the first B trial when the delay between hiding and searching is long than when it is short, but the delay that infants can tolerate without producing perseverative errors increases with age (Diamond, 1985; Marcovitch & Zelazo, 1999) . Are we to attribute age-related improvements in delay tolerance to developing processes of consciousness? If so, then those processes would appear to possess attributes (such as decay) normally associated with memory. Even more problematic for a conscious reflection account are the dissociations sometimes observed between looking and reaching on the first B trial (e.g. Diamond, 1990 ). Given our current understanding of EF, these effects would seem to be well accounted for by the development of response inhibition and memory control processes (Diamond, Cruttenden & Neiderman, 1994) , i.e. by more traditional (and less ephemeral) EF. It is therefore unclear how Marcovitch and Zelazo's appeal to conscious reflection extends our understanding of the development of EF.
It remains to consider the key evidence for Marcovitch and Zelazo's hypothesis: the U-shaped effect of number of A trials and the systematic nature of responses on subsequent B trials. First, the data-fitting of Figure 6 is misleading. This involves the use of three parameters to fit three data points and hence is not persuasive. Second, the U-shaped effect requires further empirical investigation. The main study cited by Marcovitch and Zelazo in support of the effect with infants (Marcovitch et al. , 2002) compared the proportion of erroneous A responses after 1, 6 and 11 A trials. While there was a statistically significant increase in A responses from 1 to 6 A trials, the decrease from 6 to 11 A trials was not statistically significant. (Marcovitch et al. (2002) report χ 2 (1) = 2.95, p < .10 for this contrast.) Finally, even if the U-shaped effect is reliable, its origin need not lie in conscious reflection. A real possibility, and one that Marcovitch and Zelazo consider, is that it results from habituation. That is, infants may be more likely to correctly search at B on the first B trial after many A trials than after an intermediate number of A trials because after many A trials they habituate and, as Marcovitch and Zelazo suggest, start responding randomly. They rule this explanation out because, it is claimed, Marcovitch et al. 's (2002) participants showed consistency of response on B trials, i.e. 'once a correct response was produced, all subsequent responses were correct' (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2008, p. 12) . In fact, while most infants in the 2002 study did show this consistency, 41% did not! Furthermore, the observed level of consistency of response may arise from infants' attending to the novel event (hiding at location B) following habituation. Thus, the evidence for conscious reflection as a mediator of correct performance remains weak.
What, then, can we take from the HCSM? First, despite the above criticisms, Marcovitch and Zelazo deserve praise for using their model to generate a series of novel predictions, and in so doing illustrating the utility of formal methods in theory construction within developmental cognitive science. Whether the authors' predictions are unique to the HCSM is unclear, but only the development of complete specifications of competing accounts will resolve this issue. More positively, Marcovitch and Zelazo's survey of A not B models and theories highlights important commonalities across the modelsnamely that all existing models involve two systems or layers, with the lower being modulated by the higher, and the higher coming on stream later in development. These commonalities represent significant progress in our understanding of development, and clarify the areas of debate. A useful theory of development of EF must, however, do more than posit a single construct at the higher level. It must decompose that construct and relate it more directly to theories of adult EF.
When in competition against engrained habits, is conscious representation sufficient or is inhibition of the habit also needed?
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The hierarchical systems model of Marcovitch and Zelazo successfully combines elements from (a) a competing model Diamond has proposed since 1985 (Diamond, 1985 (Diamond, , 2001 , (b) a competing model Munakata put forward in 1998, and (c) the seminal notion of 'representational redescription' developed by Karmiloff-Smith (1979 , 1992 . Like Diamond (but unlike Munakata) Marcovitch and Zelazo hypothesize that the pull to make an incorrect
